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» COMPETITION POLICY IN OUR DEMOCRACY,—WHITHER?
E. T. Grether
It is an honor and privilege to be able to extend and reinterpret my position
in Marketing and Public Policy and in general. In Marketing and Public Policy
,
I depicted and interpreted the role of marketing in our narket-type society in
contrast to command-type societies directed by a central bureaucracy. This little
volume published in 1966 was preceded by a number of special studies of various
aspacts of competitive functioning and by some overall reviews that need not be
discussed here. I have been a close observer and researcher and participant in
the drama of competition in this country and elsewhere in the world for a little
V&--Q than half a century. I have had the opportunity of reporting upon my
researches and experiences in diverse publications and forums including the
American Marketing Association, the American Economic Association, the American
Ear Association, and now for the third time,—the Paul D. Converse Symposium at
2
the University of Illinois.
1
E. T. Grether, Marketing and Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
2
The publications since 1966 include: "Marketing and Public Policy: A
Contemporary View," Journal of Marketing
, July 1974; "Competition Policy in the
United States—Looking Ahead," California Management Review, Summer, 1974;
"Efficiency in Antitrust Resource Allocation," Journal of Contemporary Business
,
Autumn, 1973; "Business Responsibility Toward the Market," California Management
Review, Fall, 1969; "The Environment and Integrity of Marketing and Public Policy:
An Overview," in Public Policy and Marketing Practices , ed. by Fred C. Allvine (1973)
"Industrial Organization: Past History and Future Problems," American Economic
Review, May 1970; "Impact of Government Upon the Market System," with R. J.
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Includcd In earlier papers were the two prepared for University of Illinois
Converse Symposia. The first paper3
,
published 21 years ago, presented a broad,
overall view of the regulation of competition. For the most part, the framework
of this analysis still seems satisfactory, but 1 wish to amend my position in
that paper in one important aspect in my discussion today. 4
The second paper was concerned with enterprise and product differentiation
an4 was incited by a paper by Professor Edward H. Chamberlin presented to the
previous Converse Symposium, and by the high importance of trading stamps,
give-aways and numerous other forms of gimmickry in American marketing at the
time. I had the honor of introducing Professor Chamberlin to the participants in
the symposium when he received the Converse Award, and of sharing a room with him
at the palatial Allerton House. In a section to come, I shall refer to the
current leading Federal Trade Commission test case in the area of product
differentiation, brand promotion and advertising.
U.S.A.: THE FIRST 100 YEARS
It seems appropriate to put the appraisal today in the perspective of our
national bicentennial celebration, particularly since Adam Smith's Wealth of
Nations also appeared in 1776. tfia United States of America became the magnificent
*nA n^ww8"1!!:10? ° f ^J?**1 *101" An Analysis of the Historical Developmenta d Outlook for the Future," in the Role and Karure of Competition in ., ^rketineEconomy, university of Illinois Bulletin, Vol. 51, So. 76 (June 1954), ed. ty
4
See page U.
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c&se example of the economic consequences of the transition from a society besed
on feudal status to one based on contract. The "tilth" that came along with the
increasing "wealth" was held to be more than offset, by benefits of the release
from the tyranny of the yokes of custom and of the fixed patterns of social
relationships. Decade by decade, over the years in this country as in
Western Europe, governments have endeavored to remove or relieve the more
deleterious consequences of unregulated competition while maintaining the basis
in freedom of contract, choice end enterprise.
During the first 100 years to 1976, our portion of the North American
continent was occupied in a tremendous demonstration of government facilitating
individual initiattve. The population tidal wave first rolled westward into the
Midvsst and great plains areas, then jumped to the West Coast during the Gold Rush
arA then rippled from both sides into the Rocky Mountain and northern plains areas,
Serais of this area had not even been incorporated into statehood by the end of the
first century, Montana, with its huge land mass, for example, was admitted to the
Union tdth its few inhabitants only in 1889. The speed and character of the
post Civil War rush were greatly affected by two important pieces of federal
legislation, both enacted in 1862; viz., the Homestead taw and the Land Grant Act.
In the first, small-scale land ownership in family holdings and enterprises was
underwritten ; in the second, public education in support of agricultural,
mechanical arts and other pursuits was subsidized. In retrospect, it is amazing
how many crucial national policy moves were made during the Civil War period at
the federal level.
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Once the issue of national political unity was settled by the Civil War,
economic unity was guaranteed through the railways, waterways, postal, telegraph
and other means of transportation and communication. The complex of trading and
of physical handling facilities which appeared at central transportation centers
end the organizing wholesale middlemen operating out of these centers, were the
media for Integrating the economic system. We were still essentially a rural
raw material producing economy and characteristically one of relatively
sraill-scale enterprises. But the creation of the economic opportunities in our
rich national and regional markets and of the integrating transportation,
corxaunication and trading facilities provided the basis for the extraordinarily
rapid development of larger scale business enterprises and of combines.
The agrarian and populist movements of the 1370*6 and 1880 's and into the
next century, reflected the strains and conflicts of the emergence of these
large-scale enterprises and combines with their Impacts upon agriculture and the
snail towns. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890
et the federal level represent the two initial efforts to relieve the economic
and political strains.
THE U.S.A. AT THE END OF THE SECOND 100 YEARS
The United States at the end of the second century is unbelievably different
from that of 1876. The most obvious transformation has been that away from a
dominantly agricultural economy and society to the world's greatest industrial
nation. Agriculture is no longer the seed bed of population growth and of
national values. Our population instead of being largely decentralized over
great space is now highly concentrated in metropolitan areas with their inner city
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centers and suburban rings. We are now much wore literate with the overage level
of education extending into the first year of college. Even more important » the
radio and television superimposed upon the means of corruunlcation at the end of
the previous century sensitize all of us daily to the entire world scene.
Probably the most significant social consequence of all has been the loss of the
rural industries and areas as great instruments for Individual therapy and social
i
shock absorption. For decades, people with personal problems tended to disappear
temporarily or permanently into the farms and ranches where they worked with
their hands , with animals and in close relationship with natural processes.
These outlets for the most part are no longer available among the small proportion
of our population engaged in agricultural pursuits,—and when they are, machines
powered by petroleum derivatives, here, too, have replaced hand work and animal
energy. There are more horses now in our metropolitan areas than in the farms
and ranches. Animals, as well as grain, forage and other crops, are raised and
handled by factory-type methods. The haying and harvest crews so characteristic
of yesteryear have been replaced by one man on an expensive piece of capital
equipment. Agriculture is now highly capital intensive instead of labor
intensive.
Nowadays our cities are teeming with youth often unemployed, who roam the
streets instead of doing the chores of the farm or participating in family
enterprises. It is no solution for small groups or communes to try to restore
the good old days except as they are fortunate enough to have trust funds left
to them by capitalistic parents or grandparents, allowing them the luxury of
inefficient methods of production. Much more realistic might be a major
decentralization of people and of non-farm industries into remaining great open
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cpnces so that the congestion In metropolitan areas might be relieved. It would
be exceedingly fortunate if all who so desire could own or have access to at least
a bit of land of their own. Or, as is still true, fortunately, for hundreds of
thousands, if all who wish, could operate their own personal or family small
businesses as independent entrepreneurs or practice their professions and
arts as self-employed or independent contractors.
OOMMDtl LAW ORIGIK OF OUR COMPETITION POLICY
Our national economic policy of competition in the United States bor'
institutionally and ideologically was transplanted from Western Europe,
especially Great Britain. The tenets of our competition policy came down
the channels of British Common Law. Its pattern and content emerged slowly,
case by case, precedent by precedent, as judges adjudicated among private
grievances. It came to us in terms of rules governing the restraints on trade
and of unfair practices among competitors. It took its form and substance out
ef the grievances arising in the petty trade so characteristic of our first
century, not those of modern great corporations and complex industrial society.
Its tenets insinuated themselves into our legal procedures in the Colonies and
in the States during the first century of our nationhood, and in federal law,
beginning with the Sherman Act in 1890. The Sherman Act was not considered to be
a radical statute since it basically incorporated the accepted common law
tradition. The opportunities in our advancing frontier and the inherent
individualism magnified both the acceptance and economic results of free
enterprise and freedom of choice and trade among small competitors. The common law
of restraint of trade and of unfair competition was almost made to order for this
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setting. And only later was our national policy focused upon the protection or
preservation of something called "competition" in an impersonal sense, instead of
"competitors". The gradual shift towards the preservation of "competition" was
paio-d 1 «>d b/ the development of the abstract formal body of economic analysis of
pure and perfect competition. That is, there was a shift from a stress on
competition or restraints of trade in personal rivalries to competition as an
i
abstract, impersonal force.
SHOULD THE SHERMAN ACT EE SCRAPPED?
Obviously, the question must arise concerning the validity and applicability
of our competition policy in its historical evolution as amended over the years
by the other statutes, the orders of administrative tribunals, and especially,
as interpreted in court decisions. I need not here review the statutes and
administrative and court actions, except to note that the totality is so complex
and often so confusing that only relatively few find it comprehensible. And,
if you are a litigant, either on the public or private side, you had better check
the qualifications of your legal and economic counsel very carefully, since there
are so few qualified generalists; instead there tend to be specialists by types
of statute or tribunal, or by type of action and so on and so on. Is our body
of laws governing competition which came to us down the common law channel, outmoded
in the United States as of 1975 with its great corporations, rapidly moving
technologies, and highly efficient, sensitive well nigh instantaneous data
collection and information systems? Only those of us who grew up in rural and
small town America can truly understand the startling differences a3 between
Cf. Mark S. Massel, Competition and Monopoly: Lepal and Economic Issues
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1962).
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yesteryear and today. It is safe to predict that at some tine in the foreseeable
future there will be a demand for the repeal of the Sherman Act as outdated and
relatively irrelevant under present conditions. It might appear, at least
superficially, that giant and large and medium sized corporations, national and
multinational, would present problems that could not be adjudicated within the
bounds of common law precedents and conceptualizations derived out of the
grievances of petty trade and in terms of statutes and cases reflecting this
origin.
PIECEKTjq RKVISIOK, HOT SCRAPPING, PREFERABLE
But our present policies have enormous undergirding in the law of contracts
and agency in relation to the other related bodies of law and in public support.
Furthermore, they do allow for flexible adaptation and adjustment. Insofar as
revisions are desirable, it would seem preferable for them to be made to our
present body of law and regulation and not out of the wholesale junking of the
heritage of our past. There are enormous variations in internal organization,
managerial and decision making processes and procedures, and production processes
and in goals and objectives as between and among even the larger and giant
enterprises. We must be careful to allow for the appropriate expression of the
myriads of variations instead of trying to squeeze this enormous diversity into a
number of artificial homogeneous forms.
The slowly evolving common law approach had the inherent advantage of
flexible adjustments, case by case. Unfortunately, our legislators have tended
too readily and frequently to rush in pell mell with special rules and regulations
or jurisprudence to meet the demands of organized groups of constituents. Hence,
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competition in the traditional sense has been subverted and even sabotaged in
federal and state laws. Additional confusion has arisen out of the endeavors
in so-called hard core antitrust to force the analysis of competition into the
traditional partial equilibrium categories of economic analysis. The
identification of the "line of commerce" and of the so-called "relevant market"
have tended to become encumbered by a certain formalism and ritualism sometimes
very difficult to relate realistically to the conditions of some modem
enterprises and markets. The increasing aurber of private treble damage
actions have tended to accentuate this ritualism in the calculation of the
amounts of damages. Much of the nature and meaning of competition is lost when
the analysis is confined too narrowly or forced into the bounds of artificial
categories and definitions. Competition can be and should be adaptable to
national, regional and local variations in supply and deisand factors and to
organizational differences.
A year ago while traveling about Japan, I said to myself, "The Japanese
ought to bow down each day before the goddess of market coordination,—imagine
trying to direct all of these labyrinthal activities through a central
bureaucracy."
Above all, market competition guarantees the availability of choices among
genuine independent alternatives at all, or most levels of economic activity, but
especially at the consumer-buyer level. If such opportunities for choice disappear
in local markets, then they will be relatively meaningless in the voting
precincts. Just as the mores of cocmon law competition insinuated themselves into
our economic way of life in this country, so could those of non-tnarket forma of
economic organization almost imperceptibly replace market competition, and in fact
may be doing so. Although market competition is still the preferred way of economic
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organization in this country it no longer is considered to be the only vay.
And many are looking hopefully to the expansion of non-market forms of
organization.
THE WIDESPRrjU) DISTRUST OF GREAT BUREAUCRACIES
It is trite nowadays to state that distrust with respect to all large
bureaucracies is widespread, in fact, rampant in the United States,—whether
federal, state, private, organized labor, educational—or what! The recent and
current ecological, conservationist, consumeristic and so on expressions are not
superficial passing phenomena. One of the most basic social issues of our times
is the maintenance of access to nature's bounty in land, water and air together
with opportunities for the exercise of creative talents in business, professional,
artistic or other pursuits.
Undoubtedly, there will continue to be a sharp cleavage as between the forces
of the right or so-called conservatives, and left, so-called liberals and
progressives, with pockets of sharper division outside these groups. The forces
on the "right" will continue to call upon the representatives of the great private
bureaucracies to whip the public bureaucracies "into better shape". The forces
on the left will tend to overemphasize the role and contribution of the government
and will tend to call upon government at all levels to whip the private
bureaucracies into better shape. Standing outside will be the critics of both
bureaucracies who would like to whip both the public and private bureaucracies into
better shape in accordance with their particular political and social ideologies and
objectives.
Cf. Corwin D. Edwards, "The Future of Competition Policy: A World View,"
California Management Review. Summer 1974, Vol, XVI, Ho. 4, pp. 112-126.
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YIIE SHIFT TO MORE POSITIVE REGULATION
And this now brings me to the shift in ray own position as stated in ray first
paper before an Illinois symposium and elsewhere. It has been ray consistent view
that it should be possible to maintain and/or restore a sufficiently acceptable
level of effective market competition in general and in particular situations,
that would be preferable usually to alternatives, especially to non-market
alternatives. I still hold this view, with an exception for the solution of some
conservationist-ecological problems, which will require some expansion of
governmental programs and regulation.
In my earlier view, I contended that the tests of acceptable competition should
not involve evidences of economic and social performance except as these were
essential to demonstrate that the enterprise was in free or acceptably active
competition under existing laws. Enforcement should be directed at maintaining,
preserving and restoring competition instead of requiring specific affirmative
actions and evidences of economic and social performance. In other words, the
maintenance of competition would be largely in terms of "Thou shalt note" instead
of the "Thou shalts". It is much simpler and clearer to enforce "Thou shalt not
steal" than "Honor thy father and thy mother".
It was my view that American business should and would prefer, if necessary,
to accept structural or other changes essential to maintaining acceptably active
competition instead of enforcement in terms of the full tests of economic and
7See above, page 2.

-12-
social performance. For one thing, our courts are ill-equipped to handle cases
involving such voluminous and complex materials. Consequently, there would be
inordinate delays or even a breakdown of legal procedures. For another, such
actions could and would undoubtedly set the stage for the detailed regulation
of business, especially of large diversified corporations, by government.
The result could and most likely would be to transfer a larger proportion of
Q
business enterprises into public-utility and quasi-public utility status with
highly uncertain results in terms of their own interests and those of the public
welfare.
But the record in recent years, especially in court cases, and in the
policies of some of our great corporate entities under advice of counsel, makes it
necessary now to yield on this position. The facts of life in the enforcement
of antitrust are that corporate executives increasingly are being deposed and
are appearing in courts to explain business decisions and practices. Inevitably,
performance results are brought into evidence to interpret and defend the
decisions and practices. Apparently in many instances top management and counsel
prefer to present evidences of "social responsibility" and social performance to
those of effective competition. Consequently, as expected, legal actions are
becoming much more complex and require an entire litany of pretrial hearings,
stipulations, pretrial briefs, trial briefs, reply briefs, mammoth collections of
documents, hundreds of exhibits, and so on, including even the employment of experts
by the court to protect the health and sanity of the judges and the sanctity of
the final outcome. Possibly, we will have to establish special courts with
Q
See the proposals of Gardiner C. Means in Pricing Power and the Public
Interes t (Kew York: Harper & Brothers, 1962) .'or a new category of "collective
enterprises".
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expertise to handle these cases as proposed by KayBen and Turner. In any event,
it is little ronder that cases are subject to delays and are settled without
going to full trial; if, for no other reason, than to stop the enormous expenses
of litigation, let alone, the even larger risks of treble damage actions following
an unfavorable verdict.
LEARNING PROCESSUS OF ADVERSARY PlflCEDURES
But it appears under present conditions and those of the foreseeable future,
we shall continue with these very important and costly learning processes through
adversary procedures. These procedures could be most helpful in the important
areas of oligopoly and diversification and conglomeration. The interpretation
of oligopolistic behavior with interdependence recognized is most difficult
for courts especially in cases of alleged price and other agreements. And there
is no simple or single solution because even so-called oligopolistic industry
and market structures can be exceedingly complex and diverse. Hence, it can be
exceedingly laborious to prepare the record for the defense or for the discovery
requests. This is particularly true of price data broken dewn by product and
brand variations and by vertical and geographical sub-market segments. Finally,
the record must be interpreted and explained or if you wish, rationalized by
relating the course and pattern of prices, say, to the basic economic conditions
and trends and to competition,—in the setting of the market action, or market
structures. And the data must be collected from internal records, manipulated and
interpreted by product lines and brands, and by geographical sub-markets.
Almost never can census or other published data be definitive or even used,—which
may tell us something about the significance of the studies based on such published
data. In the presence of numerous grades and quality levels and of brand
9
Carl Kaysen and D. F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Le^al Analysis
(Cambridge: harvard, 1959), p. 254.
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differentiation, it may be necessary for all parties to agree upon a given grade
or brand or some other sampling procedure as the basis for analysis.
In many instances the internal records vill not have been kept in a manner
appropriate to the questions at issue. Consequently, special after the fact runs
Kill have to be made, or reconstructed. In all instances and situations. In the
background ore the executives, top level or production and market level,
responsible for the original decisions and practices. Many of these executives,
perhaps typically so, have never envisaged the type of situation in which their
actions must be explained under oath before a court. Hence, they are literally
in the hands of their legal counsel.
Inevitably, therefore, even though the issues are largely managerial and
economic, the lawyer occupies the strategic point in the legal action. Much,
perhaps everything, will depend upon his legal and economic insights and experience
and judgment in the perspective of the precedents of this type of case. Something,
too, will depend upon the wisdom and expertise of economic counsel. But the lawyer
is in charge and occupies the critical focal point as between the management and
the governmental agency and the courtroom. The nature and quality of the outcome
in adversary learning procedures is mightily dependent upon the wisdom, advice
and guidance of the legal counsel and of the judges hearing the pleadings.
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THE GOOD AN7) BAD HEWS
If the present state-of-affairs continues,—and there is nothing in the
<
immediate outlook to suggest to the contrary, business enterprises, especially
large, Cuuplex corporations, must include the possibility of explaining and
justifying basic decisions before administrative tribunals and courts as a regular
and continuing part of their planning and operating procedures. This could have a
sobering, salutary impact upon business management and their legal counsel which,
hopefully, would be beneficial. This may be the good news .
The bad news might be that federal and state regulatory agencies enforcing
competition policy may be expected to provide guidelines and other criteria for
business management either in terms of the traditional negatives or the "thou
shalt nots," or through specific affirmative requirements. Inevitably, there would
have to be closer, nonadversary working relations between business and government.
Most likely, almost imperceptibly, large corporations would be moving into
quasi-public utility status,—and even more so, ultimately, into the Galbraithiaa
complex of public-private enterprise in which market mechanisms would have only
residual regulative roles.
There seems to be a rising crescendo in favor of closer, nonadversary working
relations between government and business in this country, but not in the setting
just depicted. Often the practices and experience in Japan are cited in support.
But one must be very careful about generalizing about competition policies across
national boundaries. There are always marked differences in historical evolution,
legal systems, resource patterns and uses, national characteristics and traits,
etc., that affect the nature of an acceptable national policy. The differences as
between the United States and Japan are marked indeed. The mix of competition and
cooperation appropriate to Japan is not at all necessarily the pattern for us, and
vice versa.
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But what should be the nature of the cooperative or adversary relations in
this country? Certainly the drift in this country suggests r«orc effective
cooperation between business and government beyond the traditional facilitating
aids. For years some business leaders have held the French model of indicative
planning as between Big Government and Big Business in high esteem. But here,
9 s
too, there arc marked differences as between France and the U.S.A.
I We need neither a Japanese nor a French or other approach borrowed from
abroad,—not even one from Saudi-Arabia,—but our own American one appropriate
to our own history, laws, and especially to the tenets of our Democracy as
applied to our modern, restless urbanized and industrialized society. Given tine,
and in the absence of great crises, our approach should arise out of and take
its form and substance from the adjustments and precedents arising out of
strategic court cases and not out of wholesale endeavors by new legislation.
In my view the present IBM case and the F.T.C. action in the Ready To Eat
(RTE) or breakfast cereals case are of this strategic character. The ITT case
and others on the way up in 1969 also were of this character; hence, the ITT
settlements without full trial slowed down the judicial interpretation of the
1950 Merger Law. I hope that the current cases may go through full trial.
o
Cf. J. II. KcArthur and Bruce R. Scott, Industrial Planning in France (Boston,
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard, 1969).
United States of America v. International business y-ichir-'S Corporation,
Southern District of liew York; in re Kellogg Company, ec al. (January 15, 19/2).
For details, see "Efficiency in Antitrust Resource Allocation," footnote 2
above, and citatious therein.
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The outcome could be most strategic in bringing our law of competition into the
modern "Great Society" in contrast with that of Adam Smith, who, it is vorth
noting, coined this phrase as well as "the invisible hand," so greatly
overerphasized by the commentaries over the. years. The IBM case and attendant
private actions are test3 not only of the law of competition in general but more
specifically in relation to the developments in the highly important areas of
data and information processing and the complex of industries and services that
may well play the same roles in the decades ahead in our economy and society
as the automobile in the half century behind us*
In the meantime the very recent AT&T case broadens the basis of the action
to telecommunications industries and services in general and to the role and
consequences of the public utility and quasi-public utility status and of the
interrelations among plants.
The RTE cereals case should help establish the tenets of law and regulation
and of practices in the important areas of differentiated oligopoly and product
and brand development and brand promotion and advertising. It is well to remember
that trademarking and brand promotion are to some extent mandatory under our
per fie rules against agreements and cartels. Enterprises are forced to go it alone
instead of joining the wolf pack. Hence, the RTH case should help establish the
rules for product development and brand promotion and advertising so characteristic
of American marketing.
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In these and other case;;, too, we will continue the learning processes with
respect to the reasonable distinctions and boundaries as between prohibited overt
>
agreement and acceptable tacit behavior or the conscious parallelism of competition
b*»we*n t!.s faw with high or substantial recognition of interdependence, without
overt agreement. It is of utmost importance for the precedents to emerge in this
great area.
It is common, perhaps general, for American corporations to enunciate to all
employees the shalt nots essential for compliance with antitrust laws. Tt should
be possible also with some degree of assurance to enunciate the framework of a
positive pro-competition policy as suggested by the distinguished members of the
Westinghouse Board of Advice following the electrical cases, viz.:
"...the corporation's problem in relation to the antitrust laws should not
be regarded as solely, or even, primarily, the negative task of issuing and
policing strict instructions against overt collusion... More broadly, the
Corporation's business success in the future, will depend to a considerable
degree on the adoption by the Corporation of policies of vigorous (and even
aggressive) flexiLle, competitive initiative appropriate to the nature of
the electrical Industry and to the structure of the r.nny product markets
in which th? corporation sells...
"
12 (italics adaed)
.
THE LARGE CORPORATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE ANALYSTS
This advice raises two broad sets of issues in terms of the internal organisation
and policies of enterprises. First, is the extent to which a large established
corporation can successfully pursue a "vigorous and even aggressive" set of
policies and practices in all its markets under our laws affecting competition,
especially in the face of the increasing number of private actions. Second, and
12
A Report From the Board of Advice to Westinghou^e Electric Corporation,
1962, p. 10.
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closely related, Is the adjustment to and rationalization of such competitive
policies and initiatives to the nature of the industry and the structure of the
many product markets in which firms operate.
The key to the future in terms of the maintenance of a viable competition
policy nay well he in these two issues and especially in the second. Let us
recall, that competition policy in the common law tradition was highly
i
individual,—case by case, and not conceived in terns of an abstract, impersonal
force. Competition appropriate to the nature of an industry and the structure
of product markets can and should reflect the special factors, circumstances,
organization and supply and demand relations of each market down to the lowest
definable geographical sub-market. The worst thing that could possibly happen to
our national competition policy would be to try to squeeze it into a single or
simple national mold or pattern. From this standpoint the formal economics of
pure and perfect competition hac done an enormous disservice to a rational and
realistic competition policy. Let me repeat,—competition in being is and must
be highly variable,—else it is not worth preserving!
This means merely and simply that the expressions and manifestations of
competition must be and should be appraised not in terms of the hypothetical
standards of models of formal, impersonal competition but in the perspective of
the facts of the particular market setting,—i.e., the setting of the market
action—and the important historical and other circumstances and events in the
industry and product markets. Now all of this may have been simple enough
yesteryear under the conditions of petty trade in local markets backed up by
inter-market organization and mechanism. But what about the world of the great
diversified corporation, national and multi-national?
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The large corporation or any business enterprise for that matter, should
not be looked at or interpreted as a monolithic entity. The same observation
applies also to government and public enterprises* Unfortunately, either because
of overly effective public relations programs or of the publication only of
combined earnings and balance sheet figures in annual reports, or because of the
inherent human tendency to symbolize, great corporations are viewed as GM, and
IBM and AT&T, IT&T, CE, and so on, and in terms of monumental headquarters
buildings and a small number of top executives and directors with large emoluments
and the perquisites and trappings of high office.
We may recall historically that ordinary human beings when put on thrones with
crowns and sceptres and housed in palaces become endowed with divine rights! In
terms of our National Bicentennial we should recall, too, the sharp conflict
between those who wished to place the regalia of royalty upon George Washington.
And this effort might have succeeded except for the strong opposition of one
13insistent commoner who spoke in the name of "republicanism" not of democracy!
The top management of great corporations and of the larce governmental agencies
nowadays complain about the misinterpretations and lack of understanding of the
workings and performance of their enterprises. The corporate managers are
particularly concerned about our economic illiteracy concerning the workings and
results of the system of competitive enterprise. It would seem reasonable, therefore
to emphasise and demonstrate the workings of both public and private bureaucracies
at the grass roots level of the individual citizen and customer and supplier.
13
See The Journal of William Knday (with Introduction by Charles A. Beard).
(New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1927).
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So far as the private corporation is concerned in its competitive marketing
policies and programs, this could be done in part through market structure analysis,
product by product, division by division, market by market. Yet, unfortunately,
*»*c"« MM&t!.-.? structure analysis increasingly is criticized because it allegedly
represents an attack upon great corporations and upon size and concentration as
such. It is alleged to be an instrument for the deconcentration of American
industry. This position is based to some degree upon the large number of research
studies and polemical literature relating to both economic (aggregate), industry
and market concentration in this country.
To some extent, there has been an overemphasis and simplistic use of
concentration measures and of their significance. Some analysts, even, feel
that public policy decisions could be made almost mechanically in terms of
concentration indices of which there are now a considerable variety.
This whole area of analysis has attracted the attention and interests
of some very able researchers. In reaction, recently a sizeable research and
polemical literature in defense of industry concentration is arising. The more
ardent members in both groups, insofar as they can be categorized, join hands as
vigorous proponents of competition. One the one hand, deconcentration is urged
in order to restore and enhance the compulsions and discipline of the market and
to reduce "market power". On the other hand, the large corporation in oligopolistic
competition in our complex industrial society is praised because it "tends to achieve
the competitive prices and rates o£ profit that the old classical model of
14
'atomistic' competition was supposed to achieve." The "Industrial Reorganization
14
Neil H. Jacoby, "Antitrust or Pro-Competition? 1 ' California Management Review,
Summer 1974, Vol. XVI, Ho. 4, p. 56. Dean Jacoby takes a very strong nro-corpetitio;
stand including a recommendation for the creation of an Office o£ Competition within
the Executive Office of the President or an Independent Competition Commission.
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Act" Introduced by Senator Philip A. Hart Is serving as a catalytic agent in
focusing the polemics as between the deconcentration-market power group and those
15
who defend concentration and enterprises in oligopolistic competition.
In any event, the polemics clearly support the learning processes under way
in strategic court cases. Hopefully, we shall have the time for these processes
to continue, including the improving and interpreting of data illuminating the
ways in which competition works locally, regionally, nationally and world-wide.
Now this is not nearly as horrendous as it sounds. Large corporations for
internal organizational planning and control purposes usually do prepare such
decentralized data and use them both in planning and in operations. Hundreds of
American firms patronize services that give them a running record of market share
positions by brands and by geographical territories. There tend also to be
product and brand managers and territorial divisions and breakdowns. Always,
there is knowledge of and awareness of actual and potential competition. Almost
all business enterprises are doing market structure analysis, formally or
informally, for their own planning and control purposes, without calling it such.
Undoubtedly, however, the market structure analysis as used in antitrust
enforcement, coupled more recently with the requests by the S.E.C. and F.T.C.
for product line or lines of business reporting, has served for the time being
to bring the governmental agencies and business into even sharper adversary
positions. Is this necessary or desirable? To the contrary, this whole issue
For the pros and cons, see Lee E. Preston, "Is It Timely for Industrial
Reorganization?" California Management Kevlow, Summer 1974, Vol. XVI, No. 4,
pp. 68-80. For a collection of essays defending concentration and critical of some
widely accepted economic literature, especially the theory of monopolistic competition
of Edward 11. Chamberlin, see Yale Brozen, The Competitive Economy , Vol. I (Cencral
Learning, 1974) and the forthcoming Vol. II.
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could become a means for resolving differences and for establishing better working
relationships. This is an area in which a dialogue between business and
government could be exceedingly useful to all parties. For one thing the matter of
the character and applicability of data that should be provided should be
resolved. This will require a large amount of serious, intelligent effort on
the part of qualified experts. For another, it should be possible for business to
i
indicate whether and how its interests would be served or harmed by the provision
of such data.
It would appear that such data should not be injurious,—in fact to the
contrary, unless the deep pocket, cross-subsidization, reciprocity and artificial
transfer prices are important in internal planning and management. I have long
held that these practices tend to be overemphasized by the critics of business.
If I am right, then, in the main, there is nothing to lose by preparing such data
and by disclosure.
It could be enormously heartening to local and regional competitors to be
assured that their national competitors are not subsidizing their local dealers
or other outlets through unfair methods derived out of size and diversity alone.
Very likely punitive local treble damage actions might be forestalled. Furthermore,
time and again, internal organization and planning and controls might be improved,
especially if there is the awareness of the possible necessity of explaining the
policies and practices in local markets as acceptably pro-competitive. But most
important of all, in terms of our competition policy, much of the mystery would be
16
Cf. the analysis and suggestions of Betty Bock, in Hue of Business Reporting:
Problems in the Formulation of a Data Program (The Conference Board, November 1974).
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taken out of corporate operations including the suspicions and misconceptions -
arising out of the monolithic image.
Along these lines business and government night learn to vork together in
support of a realistic and acceptable competition policy, understood and supported
at the grass roots levels of consumer and dealer buyers and in the purchase of
supplies and equipment. A basic tenet of our competition policy should be the
maintenance of the opportunities for choices among independent alternatives
at all levels, except when substantial economies of scale or better quality
service would be sacrificed. Such choice should be available also as between
public and private services whenever feasible.
A CAVEAT VTCTH RSSPKCT TO ENTERPRISE DIFFERENTIATION'
Just as product differentiation can be real or fancied, so with enterprise
differentiation. Basic enterprise differentiation is supported solidly in
innovative product development and differentiation, and services and methods of
operation, and/or in the planned, managed and coordinated diversification of
products, functions and market levels. The public imagery and symbolism of such
enterprises might appear to be the same as for, say, pure investment conglomerates,
but the footing and hence the meaning would be quite different. Baric enterprise
differentiation could become the source for some amount of patronage sometimes
characterized as "monopoly thrust upon the firm".
Investment conglomerates are readily subject to market structure analysis,—unit
by unit, division by division. But the units under planned and coordinated
diversification intended to optimize the benefits of mutual reinforcement (synergy)
might not lend themselves to simple, clear structural analysis. Even so, one should
always begin in this way on a flexible basis, if for no other reason than to
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highlight the problem areas for further analysis. Too little is known as yet
;
about all of this in the manufacturing industries. Certainly, in some cases,
the presence of combinatorial benefits and of systemic processes vith hi*h joint
costs, make simple discrete analysis difficult or even meaningless. It would
seem likely, however, that eventually relatively similar types of enterprises
would appear in competition and these would, at least, to begin with, be the
units for market structure analysis. This occurred in the traditional wholesale
and retail trades in which assortments were influenced by the interdependencies of
demands. Enterprises with similar assortments became recognizable competitors,
often under oligopolistic competition. More recently, the developments in the
supermarket area have followed the same course,—but with variations.
As yet, we have too little solid evidence concerning the nature and benefits
of planned synergy in .American manufacturing industries. Unfortunately, the
stock market experience with the conglomerates which allegedly possessed this
mysterious alchemy has cast a shadow over this type of conceptualization, except
in some of the trade press. It is alleged that some Japanese enterprises are
organized and managed along these lines. But, so far, no research evidence has
appeared. In any event, the conjoined learning processes in adversary procedures
and In discussions of segmented and product line reporting, may be expected to
Illuminate this area.
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A FINAL OnSF.KVATIO:?
In conclusion, I quote from Marketing and Public Policy:
"It should be feasible, however, in an educated, literate democracy
to work out and maintain the appropriate relations and balance between
the political forces,—law and regulation—and the inherent forces of
the 'rule of competition'. Unless such a balance can be maintained,
then the society must be prepared step by step to sacrifice the basic
values and efficiencies associated with genuine freedom of choice by
consumers and freedom of enterprise in production and marketing. . .the
maintenance of an appropriate balance in a society with a firm
commitment to the preservation of a private enterprise base should be
much simpler than the achievement and maintenance of micro-balance
in a command 'society'."
Op. cit., p. 102; 6ee also Gregory Grossman, "Notes for a Theory of the
Command Economy," Soviet Studies, Vol. XV , Ko. 2, October 1963.
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